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Abstract This paper offers estimations of the evolution of the shadow econ-
omy in three Mediterranean countries, namely France, Spain and Greece. A
multiple indicators and multiple causes model based on the latent variable
structural theory has been applied. As established by Giles (Working paper
on monitoring the health of the tax system, 1995), filtered data to solve the
non-stationary problems are used. The model includes the tax burden (both
as a whole and disaggregated into direct taxes, indirect taxes and social secu-
rity contributions), a proxy of regulation burden, the unemployment rate and
self-employment as causes of the shadow economy and the GDP growth rate,
the labour force participation ratio and the currency ratio as indicators of the
underground economy. The results confirm that unemployment, the fiscal bur-
den and self-employment are the main causes of the shadow economy in these
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countries, and confirm that an inverse relationship exists between the official
GDP growth rate and that of the unofficial economy.
Keywords Shadow economy · Structural equation model
JEL Classification O17 · C39 · H26
1 Introduction
The effects of the shadow economy (SE) are numerous and important. The
SE reduces government revenue and distorts official indicators (growth, unem-
ployment, incomedistribution, etc.), thereby influencing public sector decisions,
producing changes in individual incentives and remuneration factors, etc. As
a result, academic and political interest in the SE has greatly increased in the
OECD countries in recent years. In this study we estimate the determinants and
the size of the SE in three countries (France, Spain and Greece) which share
common historical, geographical and cultural roots, but whose recent economic
performances are highly varied. These specific countries have been chosen in
order to determine if any relationship exists between the level of per capita
income and the development of the SE and, additionally, to decide if the causes
and indicators are the same in these countries. In line with the proposal of Frey
and Weck-Hanneman (1984) multiple indicators and multiple causes models
are employed.
The initial problem for researchers into this subject is the definition and con-
sequent understanding of exactly what the SE is. The nature of the SE appears
to mean very different things to macroeconomists, labour economists, crimi-
nologists, taxation specialists and national revenue accountants. Apparently, no
single definition of the underground economy is applicable to all such fields. Sev-
eral papers have commented upon this problem, notably Schneider and Enste
(2000), Giles and Tedds (2002), and Dell’Anno (2003). Although it is impos-
sible to select the best general definition, because the adequacy of taxonomy
used must be related to the need to employ a definition and respect the specifi-
cations of the econometric model, many authors believe that estimates should
represent those productive activities which cannot be directly observed for eco-
nomic reasons. For example, activities performed with the express intention of
avoiding taxes, social contributions which benefit employees or are intended to
avoid observing legal requirements concerningminimumwages, working hours,
health and safety regulations, etc.1
The methods usually applied to estimate the SE may be divided into direct
and indirect approaches. Direct methods are based on contacts with or obser-
vations of persons and/or firms to gather direct information about undeclared
income. There are two types: the auditing of tax returns and surveys. Indi-
rect methods try to determine the size of the hidden economy by measuring
1 These estimates exclude illegal activities, domestic labour, intra-family transfers, etc.
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the “traces” it leaves in the official statistics. They are often called indica-
tor approaches and use mainly macroeconomic data. Such methods can be
divided into six categories: (1) the discrepancy between national expenditure
and income statistics; (2) the discrepancy between the official and real labour
force statistics; (3) the transaction approach; (4) the currency demand (or cash-
deposit ratio) approach; (5) the physical input (e.g. electricity) method; and (6)
the model approach or MIMIC method.
In this paper theMIMIC approach is applied to estimate the evolution of the
SE in France, Spain and Greece. The model or MIMIC approach understands
the dimension of the hidden economy to be a “latent variable”, and there-
fore applies statistical modelling, namely structural equation modelling (SEM),
commonly employed in social research (psychology, sociology, marketing, etc.)
to explore unobservable variables such as attitudes, personality, beliefs, satis-
faction, etc. As shown by Schneider and Enste (2000), and similarly argued by
Prokhorov (2001, p.17), in the evaluation of the SE these methods generally
yield reasonable results which fall within the range of difference between the
overestimating macro-methods and the underestimating micro-methods.
We develop a model for France, Spain and Greece because we assume that
these countries have commoncultural roots as a result of geographical proximity
and historical background. Their similarity allows us to employ the philosophy
of “ceteris paribus” and, assuming that sociological and historical development
evolve identically, to focus exclusively upon the effects of economic variables
on the SE in order to determine their importance in each country.
The current paper concentrates exclusively upon economic issues which have
a potential relation with the SE, such as the composition of the labour force and
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. We adopt the hypothesis that such
variables are different for each country, and therefore believe that by calculat-
ing the same econometric framework for each of the three countries we may
improve our knowledge of the economic causes of the SE and its development
in France, Spain and Greece.
As Schneider (2004) states, Greece has the largest SE in Europe, followed
by Italy and Spain, whereas that of France is especially low. Thus, by selecting
these countries we can develop a benchmark analysis and highlight the main
differences between them. Estimates for these countries can be also found in
Schneider (1997, 2005).
Greek shadow economy has also been estimated by Kanellopoulos et al.
(1995), who applied a discrepancy method between expenditure and income
estimates, and by Tatsos (2001), who used a monetary approach. Analysis and
estimates of French underground economy can be found in De Grazia (1983),
Barthelemy (1989) and Blank (1994). Spanish hidden economy has been also
estimated utilising different methods: Lafuente (1980), Moltó (1980), Mauleón
and Sardá (1997),Gómez-Antonio andAlan˜ón (2004), andGadea and Serrano-
Sanz (2002) (monetary approach); Ruesga (1984) (labour market approach);
or Alan˜ón and Gómez-Antonio (2005) (MIMIC approach).
The current paper is organised as follows. In Sect. 2 the Structural
Equation Model (SEM) is presented and the MIMIC method is analysed.
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In Sect. 3 the specification of the models and the structural relationships be-
tween causes and indicators are discussed, and then identified and estimated in
Sect. 4. Our results are presented in Sect. 5 and, finally, our main conclusions
are presented in Sect. 6, followed by five statistical appendices.
2 The structural equation approach and the shadow economy
The structural equation model consists of statistical relationships among latent
(unobserved) and manifest (observed) variables. It implies a structure of the
empirical covariance matrix2 which means that once the parameters have been
estimated, they can be compared to the resulting model-implied covariance
matrix. If both matrices are consistent, then the structural equation model
is a likely explanation for the relationships among the examined variables.
The structural equation models are “regression equations with less restrictive
assumptions that allow measurement error in the explanatory as well as the
dependent variables” (Bollen 1989). Thus, this method is theoretically supe-
rior to regression analysis not only because it explores all the information
contained in the covariance matrix, as well as the variance, but also because
it allows variables to be measured taking error into account; however, com-
pared to regression and factor analysis, SEM is a relatively unknown tool in
economics.3
In this paper, we employ one facet of SEM, namely the multiple indica-
tors and multiple causes model.4 The first researchers to consider the size of
the hidden economy as an “unobservable variable” were Frey andWeck-Hann-
eman (1984); they introduced theMIMICmodel constructed by Zellner (1970),
Goldberger (1972), Jöreskog and Goldberger (1975) and others in this field.5
This kind of model comprises two types of equations, namely structural
equations and the measurement equations system. The equation that captures
the relationships between the latent variable (η) and the causes (Xq) is called the
structural model, while the equation which links the indicators (Yp) with the
latent variable (underground economy) is called the measurement model.
2 Hence an alternative name for this field is “analysis of covariance structures”.
3 The most comprehensive discussions of its applications can be seen in: (Sociology) Bielby and
Hauser (1977), (Psychology) Bentler (1986), (Economics) Goldberg (1972), Aigner et al. (1984),
Hauser and Sewell (1986), Pindyck and Rotemberg (1993), Brumm and Cloninger (1995), Brands-
tatter and Brandstatter (1996), Brumm (1997), Baldini and Cherubini (1998), Rettig et al. (1999),
Eijffinger et al. (2000), Breitung (2001), Gerpott et al. (2001). For an overview of SEM see Hayduk
(1987), Bollen (1989), Hoyle (1995), Maruyama (1997) or Byrne (1998).
4 This belongs to the linear interdependent structural relationships (LISREL)family of models
(see Jöreskog and Sörbom 1993).
5 Following Frey and Weck-Hanneman’s, other economists have used this approach in a statistical
analysis of the “unofficial” economy: Aigner et al. (1988), Helberger and Knepel (1988), Loayza
(1996), Pozo (1996), Giles (1995, 1998, 1999a, b), Tedds (1998), Eilat and Zinnes (2000), Cassar
(2001), Prokhorov (2001), Giles and Tedds (2002), Chatterjee et al. (2003), Dell’Anno (2003),
Dell’Anno and Schneider (2003), Alan˜ón and Gómez-Antonio (2005).
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Thus, the SE (η) is linearly determined, subject to a disturbance ζ , by a set
of observable exogenous causes x1, x2, . . . , xq:
η = γ1x1 + γ2x2 + · · · + γqxq + ζ (1)
The latent variable (η) determines, linearly, and subject to a disturbances
ε1, ε2, . . . , εp, a set of observable endogenous indicators y1, y2, . . . , yp:
y1 = λ1η + ε1, y2 = λ2η + ε2, . . . , yp = λpη + εp. (2)
The structural disturbance ζ , and measurement errors ε all display normal
distribution, mutually independent and all variables are transformed to devia-
tions-from-means.
Considering the vectors:
x′ = (x1, x2, . . . , xq) Observable exogenous causes
γ ′ = (γ1, γ2, . . . , γq) Structural parameters (structural model)
y′ = (y1, y2, . . . , yp) Observable endogenous indicators
λ′ = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λp) Structural parameters (measurement model)
ε′ = (ε1, ε2, . . . , εp) Measurement errors
υ = (υ1, υ2, . . . , υp) Standard deviations of the ε’s
Expressions (1) and (2) can be written as:
η = γ ′x + ζ (3)
y = λη + ε (4)
by assuming6 E
(
ζε′
) = 0′ and defining E(ζ 2) = σ 2 and E(εε′) = 2, where

(pxp)
is a diagonal matrix with υ, displayed on its diagonal.7 The model can be
presented for the reduced form as the function of observable variables:
y = λ(γ ′x + ζ ) + ε = 	′x + v (5)
The reduced form coefficient matrix and disturbance vector are respectively:
	 = γ λ′ and v = λζ + ε.
6 The assumption of independence between structural disturbance ζ , and measurement errors 

is crucial for the reliability of estimates. Unfortunately, the SEM packages, do not perform this
kind of test. Hayduk (1987, p.193) explains that “. . . is purely a matter of arbitrary convention”
and is possible to test this assumption using a model re-parameterisation. An attempt to test the
hypothesis of independence between structural and measurement errors is presented in Dell’Anno
(2003).
7 In the standard MIMIC model the measurement errors are assumed to be independent of each
other, but this restriction could be relaxed (see Stapleton 1978, p. 53). In this analysis, in which
a greater number of models are estimated, the covariances between the indicators are often not
statistically different from zero. However, in the models where this assumption is relaxed the
changes in the estimates of structural coefficients are slight, and therefore the standard restriction
is maintained in order to enjoy greater degrees of freedom.
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Therefore, the following covariance matrix (model-implied) is obtained:
ˆ = E(vv′) = σ 2λλ′ + 2. (6)
To facilitate the identification of SEM various conditions are available but,
unfortunately, none of these are necessary and sufficient conditions (Bollen
1989).
The necessary (but not sufficient) condition, the so-called t-rule, dictates that
the number of non-redundant elements in the covariancematrix of the observed
variables must be greater or equal to the number of unknown parameters in
the model-implied covariance matrix (Bollen op. cit., p. 93).8
A sufficient (but not necessary) condition of identification is that the number
of indicators must be a minimum of two and the number of causes at least one,
provided that a scale to η is assigned (following the MIMIC rule). In order to
assign a scale to the latent variable it is necessary to fix one λ parameter to an
exogenous value.
3 Theoretical background for the choice of variables
In this section we explain the theoretical model applied to estimate the under-
ground economy, bearing inmind the observation ofDuncan (1975), who points
out: “The meaning of the latent variable depends completely on how correctly,
precisely and comprehensively the causal and indicator variables correspond to
the intended semantic content of the latent variable”. We agree with Thomas
(1992), and believe that the choice of variables is the most relevant limitation
of this approach.
As mentioned above, these kinds of models are determined both by various
causes of the latent variable and by several indicators. It is usually accepted that
the causes include the high tax burden, the share of government employment
on labour force, the unemployment rate and self-employment. In our analysis
the indicator variables include real GDP, the participation ratio of the labour
force and the currency ratio.
Although there is no consensus nor about the causes neither about the indi-
cators of the SE, we believe the use of the set of causal variables and indicator
variables listed above is the correct approach to evaluating the development of
the shadow economy.
All these variables are linked, in one way or another, to the SE and have
previously been used in the partial analysis of shadow economy (e.g. the mon-
etary approach, the labour force methods, etc.). The causal variables employed
are usually thought of having a direct and positive effect on the SE i.e. higher
levels of unemployment, self-employment, tax burden and, to a lesser extent,
the degree of state intervention in the economy imply higher levels of the
shadow economy.
8 Clearly, the number of observed variances and covariances must be equal to or greater than the
number of parameters to be estimated (including variance of latent factor, variances of disturbances,
covariances among observed variables, etc.).
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On the other hand, the unexpected development of the indicator variables
(monetary aggregates, the participation ratio of the labour force andGDP)may
reflect that “real economic activity”, both in terms of labour and money, differs
from the “legal” or official activity.
Therefore, although SE is treated as a latent variable, which by definition is
not directly observable, we believe our estimations reflect its development and
relative size.
Due to the lack of available information and the unfeasibility of estimating
an overly-complex Structural Equation model with regard to the sample size
we have not included other potential variables such us the resources govern-
ments spend on combating tax evasion, electricity consumption, the indices of
corruption and labour market flexibility, etc.9
3.1 Explanatory variables (causes)
3.1.1 Tax burden
According to the relevant academic literature, the most important determinant
of tax evasion is the fiscal burden. The generally accepted hypothesis is that an
increase in the tax burden provides a strong incentive to work in the unofficial
market, and thus a positive sign for the parameter associated to this variable is
to be expected. In all MIMIC applications this variable is included as a cause of
the underground economy and has historically always exercised a direct effect
upon the shadow economy, a fact that the current study confirms.
Within the econometric framework, the tax burden is measured as the total
share of all taxes in GDP. This indicator has been also disaggregated into differ-
ent partial proxies such as direct and indirect taxes and social contributions, as
a percentage of GDP, in order to test if all the components of the tax burden
have the same effects on the SE.
Theoretical analysis holds that direct taxes and social contributions are more
visible than indirect taxes, because indirect taxes suffer from fiscal opacity.
Therefore, a positive sign in all the components of tax burden is to be expected,
but is greater in the case of direct taxes.
The ratio between tax revenue and GDP is a measure of the effective tax
rate. We utilise this rate, instead of the marginal tax rates, because it is the one
that is used by the OECD in its international comparisons of the tax burden.
The main implication of this choice is that the effective tax rate depends on the
breadth of the tax base. Therefore it may change as a result of changes in the
tax base while statutory tax rates remain the same and viceversa.
9 We estimated models that included also indices published by the Frasier Institute and the Her-
itage Foundation, e.g. “Size of Government”, “Legal System & Property Rights”, “Labor force
share with wages set by centralized collective bargaining”, “Unemployment insurance”, “Labor
Market Regulations”, “Regulation” and “Index of Corruption”. Unfortunately, these time series
have an insufficient sample size, inadequate frequency and missing values, which prevent a correct
application with the Model approach.
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3.1.2 Public employment upon the labour force
We have introduced this variable in order to take into account the degree of
regulation of the economy. Theoretically, the expected sign for this indicator
is ambiguous. Various authors have discovered a negative sign, arguing that,
in some industries, the presence of the state could provide a disincentive for
people to join the shadow economy. Other papers have described a positive
relation, holding that more intensive regulation gives firms a greater incentive
to undertake their activities in the underground economy.
Following Aigner et al. (1988), an increase in the size of the public sector
and/or the degree of regulation of the economic system, provides an impor-
tant incentive to participate in the informal economy. However, if greater state
intervention in the economy means an intensification of the attack upon tax
avoidance or evasion and, in general, upon the shadow or underground econ-
omy, if the relevant information was available, we would expect a negative sign.
Unfortunately, as stated earlier, there is no data available regarding the struggle
to reduce the shadow economy activities.
Therefore, we expect a positive sign for this coefficient, which will support
the hypothesis that “more state” in the market, and subsequently an increase
in regulation, provides an incentive to operate in the unofficial economy.
3.1.3 Unemployment rate
AsGiles andTedds (2002) state, there are twoantagonistic forces that determine
the relationship between the unemployment rate and the SE. On the one hand,
an increase in unemployment could imply a decrease in the black economy as
the underground economy could be positively related to the GDP growth rate
and the latter is negatively correlated to unemployment. On the other hand,
some “officially” unemployed persons spend some of their time working in the
black economy (Giles and Tedds, op. cit., p. 127), and thus wemay find a positive
correlation.
Tanzi (1999, p. 143)writes that “. . . the relation between the shadow economy
and the unemployment rate is ambiguous”. He remarks that the labour force
in the hidden economy comprises very heterogeneous people: the unemployed
and the non-official labour force (retired people, illegal immigrants, minors
or housewives) and, furthermore, there are people who have an official and
unofficial job at the same time (Tanzi, op. cit., p. 343). In this sense, the official
unemployment rate is weakly correlated with the shadow economy. Tanzi (op.
cit., p. 343) also states that “. . . for OECD countries there seems to be a broad
relation between the panel data of the size of the underground economy and
the official unemployment rates”.
Althougheconomic theorydoesnot indicatewhether the expected signof this
variable is positive or negative, we believe that there is a positive causal relation-
ship between unemployment and SE, since when unemployment raises many
workers have greater incentives to participate in the underground economy.
Therefore, we expect a positive sign.
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3.1.4 Self-employment
The number of self-employed as a percentage of the labour force is considered
to be a determinant of the informal economy. According to Bordignon and
Zanardi (1997), a high number of small businesses and a large proportion of
independent professionals and self-employed with respect to the total work-
force are important characteristics which imply a higher level of the shadow
economy. Such workers have greater possibilities for tax evasion as they usu-
ally have a greater number of deductible expenses, both from their taxable
base and their tax bill in personal income tax. As they work very closely
with their clients they can collude with them in the evasion of indirect taxes.
Additionally, they find it easier than bigger firms to employ irregular work-
ers since they have fewer internal and external auditing controls. Therefore,
ceteris paribus, a high rate of self-employment means a large shadow
economy.
3.2 Indicators
As argued above, the model approach is superior from a theoretical point
of view to other indirect methods because it combines much more infor-
mation than the others. In the present case three indicators are introduced
simultaneously, instead of a single indicator as it happens in most indirect
methods.
3.2.1 Real gross domestic product (variable of scale)
As we have already mentioned, when using the MIMIC approach we need to
fix a scale variable to estimate the rest of the parameters as a function of this
scale variable. The value of the fix parameter is arbitrary, but by using a positive
(or negative) unit value it is easier to establish the relative magnitude of the
other indicator variables.10 The choice of the ‘sign’ of coefficient of scale (λ11)
is based on theoretical and empirical arguments.
In the subject literature there is no agreement about the effects of the shadow
economy upon economic growth. On the one hand Adam and Ginsburgh
(1985), Tedds (1998), Giles (1999b), Giles and Tedds (2002), Chatterjee et al.
(2003) and Alan˜ón and Gómez-Antonio (2005) estimate a positive relation-
ship between the official and unofficial economy. In contrast, Frey and Weck-
Hannemann (1984), Loayza (1996), Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996), Eilat and
Zinnes (2000), Ihrig and Moe (2000, 2001, 2004), Schneider and Enste (2000),
Dell’Anno (2003) andDell’Anno and Schneider (2003) find an inverse/negative
relationship between these variables.
10 “ For instance if the estimate of one of the other elements of λ is 3, then the corresponding
indicator variable is 3 times as important as the variable that is the basis for normalisation.” Giles
and Tedds (2002, p. 109).
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This paper adopts an additional strategy to decide the “right” sign for the
relationship between GDP and the latent variable. As in the MIMIC model,
if the “sign” of the coefficient of scale (λ) is changed, all the structural param-
eters change signs (keeping the same absolute values and standard errors), it
is thus possible to use this factor to resolve this dilemma. The scientific meth-
odology employed is a “reductio ad absurdum”. For instance, if a value (+1)
is assigned to λ11 (Y1 = λ11η + ε1: equation of the measurement model), then
consequently the estimated structural coefficients show a positive or negative
sign. At this point the researcher can verify if these estimated signs agree with
economic theories and empirical evidence regarding the underground econ-
omy and its causes: if structural coefficients have economic significance then
the signs of the reference indicators could be considered to be appropriate. If,
however, they entirely contradict well-known theories and empirical studies
then the hypothesis that supports the “minus” sign for the relation between
the shadow economy and the reference indicator should be accepted. Thus, the
hypothesis that supports the “minus” sign for the relation between the shadow
economy and growth rate of official GDP is accepted as more reasonable for
our analysis. This means that many activities go underground during economic
recessions and periods of slow growth. Fixing this variable as the scale variable
implies that the effects of the shadow economy are measured in terms official
GDP.
3.2.2 Participation ratio of the labour force
Some authors have estimated the size of the hidden economy from changes in
the labour force participation ratio, the so-called Italian method. A decline in
this ratio over time, or a low rate relative to those in comparable economies,
may reflect a movement of the workforce from the measured economy into
hidden activities. The labour force participation ratio is calculated as the ratio
between labour force total (LF) and the population of working age (15–64 years
old).
The expected sign for this variable is theoretically ambiguous, since studies
of the shadow economy do not agree on whether changes in this ratio reflect
changes in the hidden economy. There is, however, a tendency to conclude that
people do not withdraw from the measured labour market in order to partici-
pate in the hidden economy, since there is evidence that unrecorded economy
activity is undertaken by members of the measured workforce. According to
Bajada and Schneider (2005), it is possible that the participation ratio, as well
as the number of hours worked, may be unaffected by shadow economy activity
if such activities are undertaken after official working hours or on weekends,
when individuals are not working in the legitimate economy.
Many authors include this variable in their models in order to determine
empirically if there is a relationship between this variable and the underground
economy. If we find a negative sign, itmeans thatworkers are beingmade redun-
dant and leaving the official labour force and maybe joining the SE. However,
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as our empirical analysis will show, the labour force participation ratio is only a
weak indicator for the SE.11
3.2.3 Currency in circulation outside of banks
This indicator is the basis of themonetary approach to the estimation the size of
the shadow economy. It is based on the assumption that irregular transactions
use only cash, instead of checks or credit cards, in order to circumvent auditing
controls. Hence, if this hypothesis is accepted, it is possible to estimate the hid-
den economy by comparing the actual demand for cash with the demand that
could be expected if the SE did not exist. Thus the expected sign is positive.
In the estimated models the ratio between the time series of the aggregate
M1 and M3 is utilised.
4 Model identification and estimates of the shadow economy
In order to work with homogeneous data we have used monthly, and half-
yearly data from the OECD Statistical Compendium database. These data
come from: Economic Outlook Statistics and Projections, OECD Standardised
National Accounts and OECD Labour Force Statistics for the three countries;
Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda and Boletín de Estadísticas Laborales for
Spain; and Le Institut National de la Statistique et des Eˆtudes Eˆconomiques
for France.
The identification procedure starts from the most general specification
(MIMIC 6-1-3) and continues omitting the variables which do not have sta-
tistically significant structural parameters12 (Fig. 1).
In order to eliminate the non-stationarity: X1,X2,X3,X4,X5,X6, are taken
as first differences, Y1, is converted to the first differences of logarithm, Y2 to
first differences, and Y3 to second differences for France and Spain and to first
differences for Greece.13
A relevant point, often ignored in previous analyses of the shadow econ-
omy using SEM, is the detection of multivariate normality. This assumption is
11 In particular, for France and Spain (Tables 2, 3), the coefficients calculated for the restricted
models (MIMIC 5-1-2, 4-1-2, etc.) are very similar to the widest specifications (MIMIC 5-1-3, 4-1-3,
etc.); however the estimated coefficients for the Greek models, where the participation ratio is
excluded, present quite different estimates with respect to the non-restricted specifications (see
Table 4).
12 Although the MIMIC approach is able to take into account the relationships between the
X-variables and between the Y’s, in this analysis we fixed equal to zero the covariances in order
to have more degrees of freedom. Our hypothesis is supported by two empirical evidences: (a) the
majority of models estimated relaxing previous hypothesis shows that these covariances are often
not statistically different from zero; (b) comparing the two alternative MIMIC specification (with
and without these covariances), the differences of structural coefficients are slightness.
13 “Usually, [. . .] one would consider the possibility of cointegration. Unfortunately, there is no
established literature to serve as a guide to this procedure in the context of the MIMIC model.”
Giles and Tedds (2002, p. 128).
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Fig. 1 MIMIC 6-1-3
central to preserve the statistical properties of estimators, as well as the “chi-
square” test used to evaluate the fit of models with the dataset. This choice is
based on the statistical significance of parameters, the parsimony of specifica-
tion, the p value of chi-square and the root mean square error of approximation
(RMSEA) test. The models are not multinormally distributed and thus when
selecting appropriate indicators, applying the maximum likelihood estimator
is inherently risky but nevertheless inevitable.14 When the variables are not
(multivariate) normally distributed, then maximum likelihood estimators may
produce biased standard errors and an ill-behaved “chi-square” test of the
overall model fit. To determine whether multivariate non-normality is present,
Mardia’s test (1970)15 is used. It is important to emphasise that maximum like-
lihood estimations are quite robust to several types of violations of multivariate
normality (Jaccard and Wan 1996, p. 75).
Given an unacceptable level of non-normality, some adjustments are pos-
sible. For example, Bollen (1989) suggests employing another estimator that,
in spite of non-normality, maintains asymptotic efficiency i.e. the Generalised
(or Weighted) least squares estimator. It is impossible to employ this strategy
14 The test statistics for the discrepancy functions associated with maximum likelihood (ML),
generalised least squares (GLS), and normal theory weighted least squares (NWLS) are approxi-
mately distributed as central chi-square under (I) correctmodel specification and (II) if the observed
variables are multivariate normally distributed. It is well known that when the second assumption
is violated, the researcher may prefer the Satorra-Bentler scaled chi-square. We have tried to esti-
mate the MIMIC models for France, Greece and Spain by adjusting the chi-square for the amount
of kurtosis in the data. To estimate the S-B chi-square statistic we need to calculate the asymp-
totic covariance matrix instead of the covariance matrix. Unfortunately by changing the data-based
matrix the iterative procedure does not converge and the estimates of the parameters are unreliable.
15 This test is performed by PRELIS 2.53. It provides measures of univariate and multivariate
skewness and kurtosis. In addition, a “chi-square” test can be used to check whether there is a
statistically significant difference from multivariate normality.
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in our analysis as the GLS requires an extremely large sample. A different
strategy, also proposed by Bollen is followed, consisting of transforming the
time series in order to simultaneously resolve both the non-stationarity and
non-multinormality.
In Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 the estimates of several specifications for the French,
Spanish and Greek informal economy are presented. First, in Table 1, a general
model which includes four causal variables (tax burden, unemployment, self-
employment and public employment) and three indicator variables (real gross
domestic product per capita, currency ratio and labour force participation) is
estimated for each country.
5 Estimation results and simulated effects of economic policies on the shadow
economy
Once the models have been selected and identified, an index of the shadow
economy can be constructed by a benchmarking procedure. It is one of the
most problematical aspects of the Model approach. It is worthwhile pointing
out that there are alternative calibration procedures proposed in this literature:
Giles and Tedds (2002), Dell’Anno and Schneider (2003), Tedds (2006) and
Bajada and Schneider (2005). Different benchmarking operations are due to
diverse economic assumptions about the measurement relationship between
observed and unobserved economy. According to our hypothesis, the index of
latent variable measures the changes in the size of the SE relative to the size
of official GDP. It is because the growth rate of official economy is linked to
changes in the SE as percentage of formal GDP (measurement model). With
regard to the unit of measure, it is in per cent rate because causes are calculated
as ratio (structural model). That being stated, we apply Eq. (7) to estimate the
index of SE.
The structural coefficients are multiplied for the “filtered” data for station-
ary,16 and therefore the latent variable is estimated in first differences, since
this was the transformation which independent variables underwent before the
model was estimated:

ηˆt
GDPt
= γˆ11X1t+γˆ12X2t+γˆ13X3t+γˆ14X4t+γˆ15X5t+γˆ16X6t (7)
Subsequently, the index is converted to a “level” time series by integration.17
In order to obtain the actual values of the underground economy in terms of
official GDP, an a priori known value is required. The exogenous values of
Shadow Economy as a percentage of GDP are extracted from Dell’Anno and
16 The non-stationary analysis is performed in AppendixC.
17 In this case, where the variables are all differenced to same degree, our method is equivalent to
calculate the latent variable multiplying the structural coefficients for raw (unfiltered) data.
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Schneider (2003) for France (14.9% in the period 1997–1998) and Greece (29%
in the same period); for Spain, the source of exogenous estimation is Alan˜on
and Gómez-Antonio (15.5% in 1980).
Figures 2, 3 and 4 show the evolution of the shadow economy for France,
Spain and Greece18 respectively.
Shadow economy shows a decreasing path in France for the whole period
analysed, but the reduction of SE is especially important at the end of the six-
ties and at the end of the eighties. It could be partly due to the evolution of
the tax burden. After rising sharply during the 1970s and the first half of the
1980s the tax burden in France has remained broadly at a level of 44% over
the last 20 years (Leibfritz and O’Brien 2005), whereas in Spain and Greece it
has doubled during this period. As there is a positive relation between changes
in the fiscal burden and changes in the SE this fact could explain the different
evolution of this phenomenon between these countries. We also have to take
into account that France was the first country to introduce the Value added tax
(VAT) formula for the indirect taxes in 1954.
In Spain the evolution of the underground economy is increasing especially
during 1974–1986. During this period Spanish fiscal system changed passing
from a system with lot of taxes with low taxable bases to a system with few
taxes of high taxable bases. After the incorporation of Spain in the European
Economic Community the underground economy is in the range 24–30%. As
the model stated one of the main causes of SE in Spain is the indirect tax-
ation what is ratified by the evolution of the index. The implementation of
the European VAT in Spain seemed to slow down the growth of the Shadow
economy.
The evolution of the Geek index is quite erratic and we have to interpret it
with caution. We have to take into account as Christopoulos (2003) stated, that
Greek National accounts have been revised by inflating them approximately by
28%since 1988, this fact can help to explain the erratic trend of the underground
economy as a percentage of GDP in Greece.
The results forGreece, although statistically significant, shouldbe interpreted
carefully, due to the unexpected signs for several variables (e.g. the tax burden
is not significant when used as an aggregate, the currency ratio inversely related
to shadow economy.19) In addition, it should be emphasised that the estimation
of the parameters is unreliable compared to alternative model specifications.20
As shown in Table 5, the differences in GDP per capita between France,
which displays a decreasing shadow economy, and Greece and Spain, whose
shadow economies are rising, are highly significant over the period of time
18 Although it is not robust enough, we have included the Greek shadow economy index in order
to compare it to those of France and Spain.
19 Our theoretical hypotheses assume that most participants in the hidden economy prefer to pay
in cash instead of using credit cards or checks or other means of payment which are more trans-
parent to the fiscal authorities. Thus, the shadow economy and currency in circulation should be
positively correlated
20 See Table 4, which compares cases including and excluding labour force participation.
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Fig. 2 Shadow economy index: France—(F7)
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Fig. 3 Shadow economy index: Spain—(S11)
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Fig. 4 Shadow economy index: Greece—(G10)
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Table 5 GDP per capita at current market prices and PPS; relative level EU15= 100 and shadow
economy as a ratio of GDP
France Spain Greece
1967–1976 108 28.5% 75 3.9% 65 8.2%
1977–1986 109 23.7% 73 19.6% 67 13.8%
1987–1991 107 19.6% 75 25.5% 59 20.8%
1992–1996 105 13.6% 79 29.3% 64 28.3%
2002 103 8.6% 84 26.5% 67 28.4%
Source: EUROSTAT (2003)
Table 6 Comparison between different shadow economy estimates
Countries France Spain Greece
1990 1995 2000 1990 1995 2000 1990 1995 2000
Our estimates 16.0 14.0 10.5 24.5 31.2 26.2 20.9 26.1 31.9
Schneidera 9.0 14.5 15.2 16.1 22.4 22.7 22.6 28.6 28.7
Schneider and Ensteb 12.3 – – 22.9 – – 21.8 – –
Lacko (1990–1993 average)c 12.1 – – – – – 21.8 – –
Johnson et al. (1990–1993 average)d 10.4 – – – – – 27.2 – –
Gómez-Antonio and Alan˜óne – – – 19.8 20.1 20.9 – – –
Source: aSchneider (2005); b Schneider and Enste (2000); ctaken from Schneider and Enste (2000);
d Johnson et al. (1998a, b); e Gómez-Antonio and Alan˜ón (2004)
analysed. However this hypothesis is only tentative, since further research is
needed to test it. These results are in line with the ones obtained by other
researchers using diverse methodological approaches (Table 6).
With regard to reliability of MIMIC estimates, it is a controversial matter
and the scientific debate is in progress. To summarise, the main obstacles meet
applying this approach are: (1) to be fully confident that the real meaning of
the latent variable is the shadow economy instead of another similar variable;
(2) to apply the SEM approach to small sample sizes and time series analysis;
(3) to convert the index calculated by structural model in actual values of SE;
(4) to calculate the confidence intervals associated with estimates of the latent
variable; (5) to test the hypothesis of independence between structural and
measurement errors; (6) to precisely identify the properties of the residuals; (7)
to consider that the outcomes are independent of the (exogenous) choice of the
coefficient of scale (λ).
With reference to the last criticism (7), known as the “identification prob-
lem” in the literature on structural simultaneous equation systems, it has effect
on the values of the estimated structural coefficients, hence, in the index of the
shadow economy. In fact, by changing the normalisation value (λ11), all esti-
mated coefficients change proportionally; in other words, γˆq = γ ∗q
/
λ11, where
γˆq indicate the estimated coefficients and γ ∗q represent the “not-definite-scale”
coefficients. Previous relationship means that all parameters are unique, up to a
scalar multiplication, or, alternatively, that we can estimate infinite parameters,
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Table 7 Simulated effects of economic policies on the shadow economy
Causes France Spain Greece
e2003 Level effect e2003 Level effect e2003 Level effect
Direct tax/GDP 8.1% 0.63 – – – –
Indirect tax/GDP – – 4.4% 0.62 – –
Soc. sec. contrib./GDP – – 2.9% 0.90 20.5% 4.01
Public empl./lab. force – – 4.8% 1.95 – –
Unemployment rate 14.5% 1.47 4.3% 0.97 7.8% 2.24
Self-empl./lab. force 29.9% 2.54 – – 18.6% 1.21
all of which are proportional to the coefficient of scale, with identical statistical
properties.
These criticisms suggest that extreme caution should be employed when
considering the absolute values of the estimates of the underground economy,
which are shown in the following section and that more attention should be
paid to the dynamics of the indexes calculated.
In Table 7 are shown the simulated effects in the SE ratio for the 2003 asso-
ciated to changes in estimated relevant causes of shadow economy in each
country.21
The first column is an elasticity. It measures the percentage change in the
SE ratio that arises from a change in each cause of 10% and it is calculated as
follows:
et =
(
1 − ηˆt
ηt
)
(
1 − xˆqtxqt
) (8)
where xˆqt = 0.9 ∗ xqt, and ηˆt is the simulated SE when one of the causes is equal
to xˆqt.
The second column measures the percentage change in the SE ratio that
arises from a change in the level of each cause of 1-percentage point (level
effect). These values are the structural coefficients exposed in the Tables 2, 3
and 4).
According to these simulated effects the most effective way of controlling
for the growth of shadow economy would be, ceteris paribus, through pol-
icy measures which reduce unemployment and also implementing other mea-
sures aimed to reduce and to prevent tax avoidance and underground activities
carried out by the self-employed.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have estimated MIMIC models to measure the size and the
evolution of the shadow economy in three Mediterranean countries: France,
21 In the AppendixE are exposed empirical outcomes for each country in greater details.
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Spain and Greece. As the SE is a very complex phenomenon, we have found
different causes for the existence of shadow economy in each of these countries,
and thus further research is required.
We believe that estimates of SE should be considered always an approxi-
mation, rather than exact measures and, consequently, the economic policies
resulting from these figures need to be used cautiously and with a full under-
standing of their limitations. Nevertheless, our principal conclusions could be
summarised as follows.
Whereas in the French case the shadow economy is declining, the submerged
economy in Spain and Greece is on increase. This difference may be due to
the level of development of these economies, since richer economies may have
less incentives or possibilities to go underground than lesser-developed ones.
Although we have concentrated on the tax burden as one of the main causes
of the shadow economy, the economic agents in a relatively underdeveloped
country with regressive taxes and unenforced regulations could also have stron-
ger incentives to participate in the underground economy e.g. low incomes and
insufficient public goods and services.
Results show that French shadow economy presents a decreasing path, from
36%ofGDP in 1968 to approximately 9% in 2002. Developments in Spain have
followed a completely opposite direction. Before 1977 underground economy
was insignificant, due to the characteristics of the Spanish fiscal system. The
change from a Latin tax system towards an European one caused an increase
on the hidden economy from 9 to 26% of GDP in 2002. The evolution of the
Greek SE must be interpreted with caution, but it has risen from 8% in 1980 to
28% in 2002.
In the French case all the causal variables included are significant except for
the public employment ratio, which can be interpreted as that French regula-
tions are “fair” and therefore do not influence economic agents to go under-
ground. The sign of the unemployment rate is positive, and thus appears to
be a direct cause of the growth of the shadow economy. When the fiscal bur-
den is broken down, the direct tax burden is the most important component
in France, whereas in Spain and Greece the principal component of the tax
burden, in terms of the effect upon the SE is social security contributions.
Table 2 shows that the influence of the tax burden in the French shadow
economy is caused by direct taxation, since neither Social Security contribu-
tions nor indirect taxes coefficients are significant. The indicator of the labour
force participation ratio is also significant and positive, indicating that there is
no flow of resources between the official economy and the hidden economy.
The self-employment variable is always significant in all the models, and the
expected positive sign is one of the principal causes of the shadow economy in
this country.
Our recommendation for French policy-makers is to implement reforms in
order to combat direct tax evasion and increase controls upon the self-employed
collective. Leibfritz andO’Brien (2005) recommend thewidening of the tax base
both of the personal income tax, which is highly progressive but has a narrow
base, and the corporate tax and simplifying the tax system, since it is complex
72 R. Dell‘Anno et al.
and administrative costs are high. However the level of the French shadow
economy is not particularly high when compared to other OECD countries.
In the Spanish case the results show that all the variables show the sign pre-
dicted by the theory. Unemployment is confirmed as a key cause of the shadow
economy, as described by Ahn and De la Rica (1997) and Alan˜ón and Gómez-
Antonio (2005). As can be seen in Table 3, direct taxation is not an important
cause of the hidden economy in Spain, whereas Social Security contributions
and indirect taxation coefficients are significant. The remaining causes of the
hidden economy in Spain are public employment, which displays a positive
sign and suggests that economic regulation or some state intervention both
produce and affect the shadow economy. Surprisingly, although self-employ-
ment is thought to be closely related to the shadow economy in Spain, this
variable is not statistically significant. This unexpected result may possibly be
explained by the fact that many participants in the shadow economy are in
fact self-employed, but are registered as salaried workers and perform shadow
economy activities outside of their official working hours. An alternative expla-
nationmay be that in Spain the self-employedmay choose to have their incomes
taxed indirectly, whereby taxes are lower than by direct estimation of profits.
Such favourable tax treatment may induce the self-employed to remain visible
and transparent, instead of going underground.
Thus,webelieve that, in the case of Spain, social security contributions should
be reformed in order to make the labour market more flexible and combat the
evasion of indirect taxes, while over-regulation and excessive bureaucracy need
to be drastically reduced.
Unlike the French and Spanish cases the tax burden, in general, is not sig-
nificant in the case of Greece. When this variable is disaggregated into direct
taxation, indirect taxation and social security contributions, only the latter are
significant in most models.
Althoughwehave stated above thatGreek results shouldbe interpreted care-
fully, our econometric analysis suggests the following conclusions.22 The best
Greek model in terms of fit is G10, where only social security contributions, the
unemployment rate and self-employed causal variables are significant. These
results may indicate that Greek regulations and the tax burden are weaker than
in the Spanish and French cases, since neither direct nor indirect taxation nor
public employment are significant causes of the SE. The fiscal system in Greece
is very different from Spain and France. Indirect taxes are more important than
direct ones, and this probably explains the obtained results. Tax evasion is much
simpler in Greece than in France or Spain, as it is easier to avoid indirect taxes
than direct ones. The sectorial composition of the labour force could also help
to explain the differences in the behaviour of the shadow economy since agri-
culture and related industries employ a high proportion of undeclared workers.
Whereas the participation of the labour force in agriculture in France and Spain
is low, 50% of Greek workers are employed in this sector.
22 Wemust also take into account the procedure opened by the European Commission concerning
the reliability of Greek statistics in the period prior to entry in the European Monetary Union.
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Thus, in the case of Greece, since estimation results were strange and not
highly significant,we recommend labourmarket and tax systemreforms.Labour
market should be flexibilised in order to reduce unemployment. The fact that
taxation do not seem to be a shadow economy cause in this country may mean
that there is still room to collect more taxes. It could be due both to a non-
efficient tax system and to a no too high burden tax.
According with a cross-national approach, the main conclusions reached
after empirical analysis are the following. Unemployment is one of the main
causes of the shadow economy. This coefficient presents a positive sign in each
model and for each country, and is particularly important since workers in the
submerged economy are a dual burden for the State. On the one hand, a per-
centage of unemployed workers who go underground receive social benefits,
and, on the other, if these shadow economy activities became legal, then both
companies and workers would pay taxes.
There is empirical evidence that a positive relationship exists between the
size of the shadow economy and the self-employment indicator, which demon-
strates that this variable is one of the principal contributors to the growth of
the shadow economy, irrespective of the level of economic development.
The key role of unemployment and the self-employed in the shadow econ-
omy activities are also underlined by the simulated effects of economic policy
in shadow economy.
Social contributions are a significant determinant of the shadow economy
for Greece and Spain but, surprisingly, are not so in the French case. It could be
due to the fact that the share of social security contributions in GDP declined
since the mid-1980s, although further reductions for low paid workers should
be implemented (Leibfritz and O’Brien 2005). It means that labour market
regulations can be considered as another cause of the unofficial economy in
Spain and Greece. Thus, policymakers in these countries should reform social
contributions in order to make the labour market more flexible and limit the
growth of the underground economy.
The effects of the various components of the tax burden upon the shadow
economy are different in each country. The tax burden is a fruitful area for
reform as the size and development of the shadow economy are apparently
closely related to the structure and composition of the tax system. From our
results, it may be derived that in a highly-developed tax system economic agents
perceive more clearly the real taxes which they pay.
The results obtained for these countries may indicate that their economic
performances, measured in terms of growth rate of real GDP per capita, seems
to be a plausible explanation of the changes in shadow economy. Low growth
rate of per capita incomes and insufficient provision of public goods and ser-
vices (education, health, social security, etc.) may foster the need for additional
(undeclared) sources of income.
An important additional policy conclusion may be drawn from the evidence
that the coefficient of the official GDP and shadow economy (λ) is negative.
When the official economy expands, it encourages underground activities to
move “above ground”. Summing up, policy measures aimed to increase labour
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market flexibility, simply administrative and fiscal procedures, reform the wel-
fare benefits system, increase the quality o public services, or facilitate access
to the banking system are strongly recommended. Such measures would both
improve the efficiency of the market economy and encourage shadow economy
activities to become official.
Appendix A: Data sources
Table 8 Data sources
Var. Causes Sources Annotations
X1 Total direct tax/GDP OECD statistical Semi-annual frequency
compendium database
X2 Social Sec. contrib. received OECD statistical Semi-annual frequency
by Government /GDP compendium database
X3 Total indirect tax/GDP OECD statistical semi-annual frequency
compendium database
X4 Employment, OECD statistical Semi-annual frequency
government/labour force compendium database
X5 Unemployment rate OECD statistical Semi-annual frequency
compendium database
X6 Self-employment/labour OECD statistical Semi-annual frequency
force compendium database
Indicators
Y1 Real gross domestic OECD statistical [GDP market price value/deflator
product per capita compendium database of GDP]/population in working
age (15–64 years old);
Semi-annual frequency
Y2 Labour force participation OECD statistical Total labour force (LF)/population
compendium database in working age (15–64 years old);
semi-annual frequency
Y3 Currency ratio (M1/M3) OECD statistical The frequency is modified from
compendium database monthly to semi-annual. Values are
missing from 1965 to 1980 and from
1998 to 2003
For Greece the missing values are
from 1965 to 1980 and from to 2000
to 2003 Money supply M1-SA/
money supply M3-SA
Appendix B: Analysis of normality
The following Table 9 presents the tests of normality (univariate) of the vari-
ables used in the MIMIC models (p value of the Jarque-Bera Test, performed
by Eviews 4.1). For the tests of multivariate normality distribution, the results
are reported in Tables 2, 3 and 4.
The sample size is approximately 80.
Appendix C: Analysis of non-stationarity
In this appendix we display the tests employed to detect the order of integration
in the time series. The pioneer in tackling the problem of non-stationarity in
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Table 9 Jarque-Bera test (p value)
Causes France Spain Greece
 [Direct taxation/GDP] 0.000 0.000 0.185
 [Indirect taxation/GDP] 0.000 0.146 0.052
 [SS. contributions/GDP] 0.000 0.001 0.080
 [Public employment/labour force] 0.548 0.126 0.000
 [Unemployment rate] 0.860 0.145 0.000
 [Self-employment/labour force] 0.000 0.001 0.000
Indicators
 LN[Real GDP per capita] 0.000 0.484 0.112
 [Part ratio/labour force] 0.029 0.233 0.000
 [Currency ratio (M1/M3)] 0.067 0.763 0.038a
Note: aThe transformation is the first difference
the MIMIC models has been Giles (1995). As Giles and Tedds (2002) point
out, the most appropriate way “. . .to consider the non-stationary element is to
consider the possibility of cointegration. Unfortunately, there is no established
literature which may serve as a guide to this procedure in the context of the
MIMIC model”.
To discover the unit roots, the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and
the Philliphs-Perron (PP) test are used; to choose a number of lags sufficient
to remove serial correlation in the residuals and the automatic selection of
bandwidth we have employed the Schwarz information criterion (ADF) and
the Newey-West test using Bartlett Kernel (PP). In the following tables the
p value of the abovementioned tests is reported, while the null hypothesis is
the presence of the unit root, and therefore a value greater than 0.05 indicates
non-stationary time series.
A third unit root test is applied, namely the Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt
and Shin test (KPSS, Kwiatkowski et al. 1992).23 This test differs from the
others in that the series is assumed to be (trend-) stationary, according to the
null hypothesis. The successive tables show the statistical test, and therefore if
the estimated values exceed the respective critical values,24 stationarity must
be rejected. The critical values for the LM test statistics are based upon the
asymptotic results presented in KPSS (Table 1, p. 166).
• KPSS test equation with constant critical values are: 0.347 (10%), 0.463
(5%), 0.739 (1%);
• KPSS test equation with constant and trend: 0.119 (10%), 0.146 (5%), 0.216
(1%).
The econometric software Eviews 4.1 was used in to perform this analysis.
23 The Kernel function was chosen according to Bartlett’s criteria and the Newey-West method is
used for bandwidths.
24 As the ADF and KPSS tests are adversely sensitive to the presence of breaks in the data, by
showing critical values it is possible to check these values with Kurozumi’s (2002) critical values
(Table 3, p. 86). Kurozumi’s (op. cit.) modified KPSS test allow to consider the distortion in the
statistical test distribution caused by a structural break.
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France
Variable Included Level First difference Second difference
in equat.
Causes ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS
Direct tax/GDP T&C 0.957 0.579 0.141* 0.000 0.000 0.049* 0.000 0.000 0.104*
Public emp./lab. force T&C 0.999 0.999 0.257 0.000 0.009 0.141* 0.001 0.000 0.202
Indirect tax/GDP C 0.097 0.099 0.166* 0.029 0.000 0.226* 0.000 0.000 0.215*
Self empl./lab. force T&C 0.817 0.889 0.200 0.000 0.000 0.112* 0.000 0.000 0.122*
Unemployment rate T&C 0.969 0.980 0.229 0.001 0.011 0.105* 0.000 0.000 0.167
SS. contrib./GDP T&C 0.983 0.994 0.297 0.000 0.001 0.151 0.000 0.000 0.213
Note: For ADF and PP show the MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p values; the statistical tests are
shown for KPSS; *means stationary at 0.05 level
Variable Included Level First difference Second difference First differ. LogN
in equat.
Indicators ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS
Real GDP T&C 0.529 0.485 0.123* 0.000 0.000 0.134* 0.000 0.000 0.358 0.000 0.000 0.168
per capita
Curr. ratio T&C 0.873 0.986 0.132* 0.104 0.221 0.193 0.000 0.000 0.256 0.084 0.196 0.192
(M1/M3)
Part. ratio T&C 0.422 0.970 0.200 0.000 0.000 0.140* 0.000 0.000 0.326 – – –
Lab. force
Note: For ADF and PP show the MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p values; the statistical tests are
shown for KPSS; *means stationary at 0.05 level
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Spain
Variable Inlcluded Level First difference Second difference
in equat.
Causes ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS
Direct taxation/GDP T&C 0.730 0.935 0.180 0.019 0.000 0.182 0.000 0.000 0.125*
Public emp./lab. force T&C 0.989 0.969 0.246 0.000 0.000 0.193 0.000 0.000 0.500
Indirect taxation/GDP T&C 0.736 0.857 0.281 0.000 0.000 0.057* 0.000 0.000 0.151
Self-employ./lab. force T&C 0.780 0.780 0.207 0.000 0.000 0.084* 0.000 0.000 0.202
Unemployment rate T&C 0.642 0.897 0.201 0.084 0.069 0.084* 0.000 0.000 0.032*
SS. contrib./GDP T&C 0.378 0.690 0.134* 0.026 0.005 0.200 0.000 0.000 0.127*
Note: For ADF and PP show the MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p values; the statistical tests are
shown for KPSS; *means stationary at 0.05 level
Variable Included Level First difference Second difference First differ. LogN
in equat.
Indicators ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS
Real GDP T&C 0.677 0.823 0.147 0.042 0.042 0.154 0.000 0.000 0.051* 0.054 0.051 0.185
per capita
Curr. ratio C 0.106 0.256 0.094* 0.120 0.298 0.279* 0.000 0.000 0.500 – – –
(M1/M3)
Part. ratio T&C 1.000 1.000 0.287 0.002 0.002 0.202 0.000 0.000 0.069* – – –
lab. force
Note: For ADF and PP show the MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p values; the statistical tests are
shown for KPSS; *means stationary at 0.05 level
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Greece
Variable Included Level First difference Second difference
in equat.
Causes ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS
Direct taxation/GDP T&C 0.004 0.605 0.187 0.258 0.000 0.070* 0.545 0.000 0.145*
Public empl./lab. force T&C 0.927 0.895 0.245 0.001 0.061 0.042* 0.000 0.000 0.500
Indirect tax/GDP T&C 0.066 0.552 0.117* 0.031 0.033 0.091* 0.000 0.000 0.225
Self empl./lab. force T&C 0.001 0.311 0.041* 0.005 0.000 0.249 0.000 0.000 0.097*
Unemployment rate T&C 0.146 0.422 0.147 0.056 0.146 0.132* 0.000 0.000 0.070*
SS. contrib./GDP T&C 0.075 0.155 0.064* 0.002 0.099 0.054* 0.002 0.000 0.131*
Note: For ADF and PP show the MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p values; the statistical tests are
shown for KPSS; *means stationary at 0.05 level
Variable Included Level First difference Second difference First differ. LogN
in equat.
Indicators ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS
Real GDP T&C 0.130 0.683 0.174 0.378 0.035 0.243 0.000 0.000 0.229 0.457 0.047 0.262
per capita
Curr. ratio T&C 0.129 0.003 0.198 0.054 0.003 0.202 0.000 0.000 0.391 – – –
(M1/M3)
Part. ratio C 0.572 0.228 0.401* 0.001 0.002 0.342* 0.000 0.000 0.146* – – –
lab. force
Note For ADF and PP show the MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p values; the statistical tests are
shown for KPSS; *means stationary at 0.05 level
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Appendix D: Analysis of residuals
In this appendix, the q-plots of residuals are shown in order to verify the nor-
mal distribution of the residuals25 of theMIMICmodels chosen for the French,
Spanish and Greek shadow economies. Unfortunately, there are several limita-
tions upon the precise identification of the properties of the residuals, especially
in when there are missing values in the data. Below, the q-plots produced by
the Lisrel 8.54 software are reported. These graphs show a sufficiently normal
distribution of residuals.
25 InLISREL terminology a “residual” is the difference between anobserved andfitted covariance.
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Appendix E: Simulated effects of economic policies on the SE for 2003
France
Elasticities:
• Reductions of direct tax rate by 10% (from 11.7 to 10.6%) would reduce the
SE by 8.1% (that is 0.7-percentage point: from 9.1 to 8.4%).
• Reductions of unemployment rate by 10% (from 9.4 to 8.4%) would reduce
the SE by 14.5% (that is 1.4-percentage point: from 9.2 to 7.8%).
• Reductions of self-employment rate by 10% (from 6.6 to 5.9%) would
reduce the SE by 29.9% (that is 1.7-percentage point: from 9.2 to 7.5%).
Level effects:
• Reductions of direct tax rate by 1-percentage point (from 11.7 to 10.7%)
would reduce the SE by 0.6-percentage point (from 9.1 to 8.5%).
• Reductions of unemployment rate by 1-percentage point (from 9.4 to 8.4%)
would reduce the SE by 1.5-percentage point (from 9.1 to 7.6%).
• Reductions of self-employment rate by 1-percentage point (from 6.6 to
5.6%) would reduce the SE by 2.5-percentage point (from 9.1 to 6.6%).
Spain
Elasticities:
• Reductions of indirect tax rate by 10% (from 11.3 to 10.1%) would reduce
the SE by 2.9% (that is 0.8-percentage point: from 27.3 to 26.5%).
• Reductions of social security contribution rate by 10% (from 13.5 to 12.1%)
would reduce the SE by 4.4% (that is 1.2-percentage point: from 27.3 to
26.1%).
• Reductions of public employment rate by 10% (from 13.1 to 11.8%) would
reduce the SE by 4.8% (that is 1.3-percentage point: from 27.3 to 26.0%).
• Reductions of unemployment rate by 10% (from 12.0 to 10.8%) would
reduce the SE by 4.4% (that is 1.2-percentage point: from 27.3 to 26.1%).
Level effects:
• Reductions of indirect tax rate by 1-percentage point (from 11.3% to 10.3%)
would reduce the SEby 0.9-percentage point (from 27.3% to 26.4%).Reduc-
tions of public employment rate by 1-percentage point (from 13.1% to
12.1%)would reduce the SEby 2.0-percentage point (from27.3% to 25.3%).
• Reductions of social security contribution rate by 1-percentage point (from
13.5% to 12.5%) would reduce the SE by 0.6-percentage point (from 27.3%
to 26.7%).
• Reductions of unemployment rate by 1 percentage point (from 12.0% to
11.0%) would reduced the SE by 1.0-percentage point (from 27.3% to
26.3%).
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Greece
Elasticities:
• Reductions of social security contribution rate by 10% (from 13.8 to 12.5%)
would reduce the SE by 20.5% (that is 5.5-percentage point: from 26.7 to
21.2%).
• Reductions of unemployment rate by 10% (from 9.5 to 8.4%) would reduce
the SE by 7.8% (that is 2.1-percentage point: from 26.7 to 24.6%).
• Reductions of self-employment rate by 10% (from 37.6 to 33.8%) would
reduce the SE by 18.7% (that is 5.0-percentage point: from 26.7 to 21.7%).
Level effects:
• Reductions of social security contribution rate by 1-percentage point (from
13.8 to 12.8%) would reduce the SE by 4.0-percentage point (from 26.7 to
22.7%).
• Reductions of unemployment rate by 1-percentage point (from 9.5 to 8.5%)
would reduce the SE by 2.2-percentage point (from 26.7 to 24.5%).
• Reductions of self-employment rate by 1-percentage point (from 37.6 to
36.6%) would reduce the SE by 1.2-percentage point (from 26.7 to 25.5%).
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